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This paper evaluates the impact of the First World War on the development of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) regarding the treatment of prisoner of war (POW). 
In contrast to traditional scholarship, which overlooks the war’s significance on the jus 
in bello, we argue that in the area of POW law, the changes brought about by the war 
were significant and long lasting, and led to the creation of a POW convention in 1929 
that set IHL onto a markedly different path from that followed before 1914. Although the 
process was only completed with the signing of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949, 
many of the distinguishing features of modern POW law had their roots in the experience 
of captivity during the First World War and the legal developments that followed in its 
wake. In particular, the scale, duration and intensity of wartime captivity after 1914 gave 
rise to a conceptual shift in the way POWs were perceived, transforming their status from 
‘disarmed combatants’, whose special privileges were derived from their position as 
members of the armed forces, to ‘humanitarian subjects’, whose treatment was based on 
an understanding of their humanitarian needs and rights. 
The legal significance of the First World War is generally judged to lie in the impact it exercised 
on the jus ad bellum and in crystallizing ideas around such concepts as collective security and the 
protection of minority populations. By contrast, its imprint on the jus in bello is considered to 
have been comparatively slight. Having just concluded the ‘war to end all wars’ and embarked 
on an era that sought to outlaw force from the conduct of international affairs, statesmen and 
lawyers alike were understandably wary after 1918 of devoting their energies towards legislating 
on how future wars might be fought. No attempt was made to resuscitate The Hague ‘peace’ 
conferences and such steps that were taken to codify the conduct of hostilities – the draft Hague 
Rules on Air Warfare (1923), and the League of Nations’ World Disarmament Conference 
(1932-34) being the most obvious examples – revealed both the dangers implicit in such 
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endeavours and their ultimate futility. Only the 1925 Geneva Protocol, prohibiting the use of 
poisonous gas, and the two Geneva conventions of 1929, dealing with the battlefield sick and 
wounded and prisoners of war, proved capable of withstanding the test of time.1 This meagre 
record is in stark contrast to the wave of codification that followed in the wake of the 1939-1945 
war.  It is the post-1945 paradigm, hewn from the experiences of the Second World War and 
embedded in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, that is typically held to provide the template 
for today’s ‘law of armed conflict’, or international humanitarian law (IHL).2 
 This paper challenges the orthodox view that the developments in jus in bello arising 
from the First World War are of little consequence or simply reflected traditional 19th century 
norms.3 Focusing on the law relating to the treatment of prisoners of war – ‘POW law’ – we 
argue that the war’s impact on the jus in bello was both significant and long lasting. We do so by 
drawing on our respective methodological approaches, as an historian and a lawyer; offering a 
revised account of the changes wrought by the war in the treatment of POWs, and then 
identifying how these changes shaped the direction of legal thinking after the war. Far from 
generating ideas that merely echoed customary practice, we argue that the First World War not 
only transformed the position of prisoners of war, by conferring on them the status of 
‘humanitarian subjects’, but also exercised a profound influence on this area of international law, 
the effects of which are still with us today. In the process, the paper contributes to our broader 
understanding of how international law shaped, and was in turn shaped by, the experience of war 
                                                          
* Professor, School of Politics & International Relations, University of Nottingham, UK. Email: 
neville.wylie@nottingham.ac.uk.  
 
** Legal Division, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland. Email: 
lcameron@icrc.org.   
 
The authors are grateful for the advice of the journal’s anonymous reviewers and for the opportunity to 
explore the themes in this paper at the workshop on ‘International Law and the 1st World War’ (Jesus 
College Oxford, September 2015), conference on ‘Law as an Ideal? The Protection of Military and 
Civilian Victims to the Test of the 1st World War’ (ICRC, September 2014), and the research seminar at 
the New Zealand Centre for Human Rights Law (March 2014). They also thank Fabrizio Bensi for his 
invaluable help in the ICRC Archives. This article was written in a personal capacity and does not 
necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC or its legal division.  
 
1 See Roberts, ‘Land Warfare: from Hague to Nuremburg’, in M. Howard, G.J. Andrepoulos and M.R. 
Shulman (eds), The Laws of War: Constraints on warfare in the western world (1994) 124-128. 
2 See Robert Kolb, Advanced Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (2014) at 1-14. 
3 See Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (1983), at 220. 
4 
 
between 1914 and 1918.4 It also prompts us to question the traditional prominence attached to 
the events of the 1940s as a watershed in the history of IHL.5 The paper begins by sketching the 
key features of the pre-1914 ‘POW legal regime’, and then turns to examine three aspects of 
captivity during the First World War – prisoner repatriation, the use of reprisals, and the 
introduction of ‘organizations of control’ – that collectively symbolized and in large measure 
inspired the transformation in POW law once the war came to an end.  
 
1. Legal Foundations 
 
The starting point for any evaluation of the First World War’s impact on the law governing the 
treatment of POWs is the Hague Convention (II) of 1899, revised in 1907 as the Hague 
Convention (IV) on the law and customs of war on land.6 Although states had their own ‘field 
regulations’ to guide them in times of war, and had periodically addressed the matter at 
international congresses since the 1870s, it was only in 1899 that the international community 
agreed on a set of legally binding rules. These rules were applicable to warfare with the so-called 
‘civilized’ word, but not always considered applicable for colonial conflicts against non-white 
opponents.7 Updated in the light of the 2nd South African (Boer) and Russo-Japanese wars at the 
turn of the century, the eighteen ‘POW’ articles in the regulations annexed to 1907 Hague 
Convention (IV) faithfully reflected current European practice, but did not prescribe how these 
                                                          
4 Isabel Hull, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (2014), at 
2. Deprechin, ‘The Laws of War’, in Jay Winter (ed.), The Cambridge History of the First World War 3 
Vols (2014) 615-638. Jones, ‘International Law and Western Front Prisoners in the First World War’, in 
A-M Pathé and F Théofilakis (eds), Wartime Captivity in the Twentieth Century (2016), 30-44. 
5 Best, Law and War since 1945 (1994), at 8-9 and passim.  
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principles were to be applied.8 Thus, ultimate responsibility for the treatment of prisoners lay 
with the captor state, not the individual who captured them or the state to which the prisoner 
owed his allegiance. The detaining power was to ensure that prisoners were treated ‘humanely’ 
at all times, to restrict their movement only as required for their personal security or as 
‘indispensable measure(s) of safety’, and to adequately compensate ‘other rank’ POWs for work 
performed, in or outside the place of detention. Such work was not to be of a military nature. In 
return, prisoners were subject to the detaining power’s laws and regulations, could be punished 
for acts of insubordination and disciplined for attempting to escape. The detaining power was 
responsible for meeting the prisoners’ basic needs; their upkeep, lodgings and victuals and, in the 
case of officer-prisoners, their payment too. Prisoners were free to follow their religious beliefs, 
communicate with their families at home and benefit from the ‘charitable zeal’ of societies 
established for their relief, whether from their own countries, their enemies or from the neutrals. 
Living conditions were set at a level commensurate to that of the detaining power’s own 
servicemen. The only area where the prisoner’s own government retained some authority was on 
the issue of parole, whereby prisoners would be granted freedoms, or permitted to return home, 
on the understanding that they would not escape or take up arms against their one-time captor. 
Governments could refuse their men the right to offer or accept parole, but once offered and 
accepted, the government could neither renounce the agreement nor force any repatriated 
prisoner to return to active service.  Prisoners who broke parole forfeited their rights as POWs 
and laid themselves open to criminal prosecution. While three articles were devoted to the 
system of parole, the regulations took no position on the wartime release or exchange of 
prisoners, and limited itself to noting that post-war repatriation should take place ‘as quickly as 
possible’ after the cessation of hostilities. 
Many of these core principles have remained the same over the past century and may 
appear to have been simply tweaked or set out in greater detail in the 1929 and 1949 Geneva 
Conventions relating to prisoners of war. However, the constancy of these essential principles 
may have obscured the significance of other changes regarding the POW regime. In our view, 
the post-war developments are better seen as a picture of continuity and change. The aspect of 
change is important to recognize because it underlines that, following the First World War, states 
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looked to make the standards more effective to protect prisoners of war, but also sought new 
ways to enhance the implementation of international law. In other words, the negotiators of the 
1929 Geneva Conventions understood that more words on paper, without the tools to make sure 
they would not easily be cast aside or trampled, were not sufficient.  
Although attitudes and detention practices after 1914 thus frequently followed traditional 
norms, the duration of the war, its scale and intensity, exposed important gaps and weaknesses in 
the pre-war legislative framework. The sheer number of prisoners – estimated at between 6.6 and 
9 million men, or about a quarter of the population of France – dwarfed earlier conflicts. The 
majority of these men were taken on the eastern front, where one in three Austro-Hungarian 
soldiers and one in five Russian soldiers fell into enemy hands. But by the war’s end, captivity 
had become a genuinely global phenomenon, with an archipelago of camps and work 
detachments stretching into every corner of the world.  
The economic importance of POW labour also assumed a magnitude unforeseen by pre-
war legislators. All the major belligerents extracted economic benefit from their enemy captives 
but it was the Central Powers, with no colonial workforce to draw on, that became particularly 
addicted to POW labour. By 1918, Germany’s 1.1 million Russian prisoners were deemed so 
critical to Germany’s economic output that Berlin refused to agree to their repatriation as part of 
the Brest-Litovsk peace talks.9  
Finally, although conditions of captivity varied widely, recent research has uncovered 
evidence of prisoner abuse, through neglect, coercive control or physical violence that overturns 
previous assumptions about the relatively benign nature of military imprisonment during the 
war.10 Opinions vary as to why this occurred, but few pre-war norms were not flouted during the 
war; prisoners were employed in war-related tasks, often within range of their own guns, and 
subjected to a variety of reprisals, either in retaliation for the perceived ill-treatment of their own 
men or for alleged infractions of other treaty or customary norms, unconnected with the status of 
prisoners of war.11 The fate and treatment of POWs thus quickly established itself as a matter of 
                                                          
9 See Davis, ‘Prisoners of War in Twentieth Century War Economies’, XII Journal of Contemporary 
History (1977), at 623-634. 
10 Kramer, ‘Prisoners in the First World War’, in Scheipers, supra note 6, 75-90, at 76-77. 
11 Hinz and Oltmer explain it in terms of the war’s waxing economic demands and the need to maximize 
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debate, and a central motif in wartime propaganda campaigns and public discourse.12 Its 
significance to post-war attitudes is apparent in French and British attempts to try those accused 
of prisoner abuse for war crimes in the early 1920s.13  
 Writing shortly after the cessation of hostilities, the lawyer J. W. Garner commented that 
‘hardly one of The Hague conventions [could not] be greatly improved in the light of the 
experience of the recent war’. Many of the pre-war rules, he concluded, were ‘inadequate, 
illogical or inapplicable’ to modern warfare.14 It is our contention that in revising the jus in bello 
after 1918, the international community went beyond making it merely ‘adequate, logical and 
applicable’, but initiated a fundamental transformation in the position POWs occupied in 
international law. We begin by assessing the war’s impact on the question of prisoner 




The repatriation of POWs was an area that had undergone a profound change over the course of 
the preceding century. As Stephen Neff observes, the 19th century saw practice shift from one in 
which prisoners were routinely released before the end of hostilities – by conscripting them into 
their captors’ armies, offering them parole, or exchanging them across the battle-lines – to one 
that increasingly saw enemy captives detained for the entire duration of the war.15 In short, 
norms relating to captivity and imprisonment came to eclipse those governing methods of release 
and exchange. This tendency was not, of course, ubiquitous. Boer commandoes regularly freed 
or paroled prisoners they were unable to detain. But the experience of the Franco-Prussian war 
and the American Civil war, where attempts to arrange exchange cartels all ultimately 
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14 J. W. Garner, International Law and the World War, 2 Vols (1920), Vol 2, at 452, 463. 
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Rothenburg, ‘The Age of Napoleon’ in M. Howard, G.J. Andrepoulos and M.R. Shulman (eds), The Laws 
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floundered, was symptomatic of the general trend.16 This process spoke to a definition of 
prisoners as essentially ‘disarmed warriors’ rather than ‘non-combatants’ or innocent ‘victims of 
war’. The 1907 Hague Regulations reflected this trend, framing the conditions of captivity and 
treatment on the basis of prisoners remaining members of their armed forces, whose behaviour 
would be governed by martial values and a warriors’ code, rooted in western concepts of 
chivalry and military honour. This was particularly evident in the articles dealing with parole, but 
was also heard in the criticisms of those who felt that the pampering of prisoners sat ill with their 
status as servicemen and might, in the words of the Austrian emperor, ‘be an inducement to 
cowardly or effeminate soldiers to escape the dangers and hardships of war...’.17 
Detention practices during the First World War amply confirm the veracity of Neff’s 
observations. The increasingly ‘attritional’ mind-set that took hold in strategic thinking from late 
1914 naturally stifled any thought of exchanging able-bodied military prisoners. With a single 
exception, discussed below, all able-bodied POWs had to wait until the end of the war for their 
liberation.18 Governments often allowed doubts over their prisoners’ loyalty or fighting spirit to 
justify withholding the dispatch of relief parcels and deny them the right to offer their parole. 
Rome’s refusal to attend to its prisoners’ welfare contributed to the very high death rates – 
upwards of fourteen percent – amongst Italians prisoners captured at the battle of Caporetto. At 
the war’s close, fear of political or biological ‘contamination’ frequently coloured official and 
popular attitudes towards returning prisoners.19 The prisoners’ desire to return home at the end of 
hostilities was thus repeatedly subordinated to the political, military or economic ambitions of 
their governments or captors, many of which reflected ethnic or national goals that bore little 
resemblance to the political realities the prisoners had known before their captivity.20 In this 
sense, the First World War was a harbinger for the kind of politicized treatment of prisoners that 
                                                          
16 Stephanie Carvin, Prisoners of America’s Wars (2010), at 63-66. 
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18 There was no code governing the treatment of civilians. For earlier conflicts, see Caglioti, ‘Waging War 
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War, Medicine and Nationalism in Turkey, 1914-1939 (2013); Giovanna Procacci, Soldati e prigionieri 
italiani nelli Grande Guerra (2000). 
20 See Hazuki Tate, ‘Rapatrier les prisonniers de guerre: la politique des Alliés et l’action humanitarire du 
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occasioned the end of fighting in 1945 and the armistice negotiations following the Korean War. 
It placed ‘the camp’ and its associated ‘regime of exception’ at the epicentre of the national 
‘warfare-state’, accelerating a process that had emerged in the Boer and Spanish-American wars 
at the turn of the century, but which became a central feature of modern state formations for the 
remainder of the twentieth century and beyond.21  
For our purposes, it is the release and repatriation during the course of hostilities that 
repay closest scrutiny, for it is in these practices that we see the emergence of a distinctively new 
status for POWs at the war’s close. The release of sick and wounded prisoners had a long 
pedigree, and had featured in the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906 and the 1899/1907 
Hague Regulations.22 The belligerents of the First World War settled on two categories of 
wounded prisoner for release and repatriation. The first category – severely wounded or 
‘invalids’ – were offered direct repatriation home. Operations commenced across Switzerland in 
March 1915, and were extended to the Netherlands and Sweden later that year. While there were 
numerous precedents for the exchange of ‘invalids’, the privileges accorded to the second 
category of prisoners – those suffering from non-life-threatening wounds or tuberculosis – was 
altogether new, and arose out of a proposal from the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), that prisoners whose injuries were insufficiently grave to qualify them for direct 
repatriation be considered for internment in neutral countries instead.  
Hospitalising prisoners in neutral sanatoriums was advocated in the revised Geneva 
Convention of 1906 – having first appeared in a draft code on maritime warfare in 1868 – but, as 
with direct repatriation, belligerents were under no direct obligation to do so.23 The first 
operation to hospitalize sick and wounded prisoners nevertheless took place in January 1916, 
                                                          
21 See Minca, ‘Geographies of the camp’, 49 Political Geography (2015) 74-83; Stéphane Audoin-
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Technological Revolution? The Great War and the Radicalization of the Prisoner of War Camp’, in Alan 
Kramer and Bettina Greiner (eds), Welt der Lager. Zur ‘Erfolgsgeschichte’ einer Institution (2013), at 
110.  
22 Article 6 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field 1864 proposed various options, Article 2 of the 1906 Geneva Convention provided for special 
agreements for it, and Article 21 of the Regulations of Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, with annex of Regulations, 29 July 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans. 247, 
incorporates the 1864 Geneva Convention by reference.   
23 Article 5 of the Draft Additional Articles relating to the condition of the Wounded in War 1868, 18 
Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 612; Article 2, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 




when a party of tuberculosis patients were received in Switzerland. The Dutch, Norwegians and 
Danes opened their doors over the course of 1916 and 1917, and agreements were reached 
clarifying the selection criteria and processing arrangements. By the time the war came to an end 
nearly 80,000 men of all nationalities had profited from early release and internment in neutral 
hospitals.24  
Practice during the First World War also departed from the written codes in conferring 
repatriation on ‘long-term’ prisoners; men who had been held for over eighteen months and were 
either fathers of large households (with three or more living children) or over a certain age. 
Needless to say, negotiations on the issue proved difficult, and despite intense public pressure, 
the first agreement, between France and Germany, was not finalized until April 1918. Thereafter, 
however, the idea quickly took hold, and was applied in various forms to German agreements 
with Belgium, Britain and America. Significantly, the rationale for bestowing special privileges 
on able-bodied prisoners went beyond merely the ‘humanitarian’ desire to release those held for 
long periods of time. It was, rather, based on medical grounds, in particular the accumulating 
evidence that pointed to the prevalence of ‘barbed-wire’ disease amongst men subjected to 
prolonged periods of captivity.25  
It would be wrong to assume that these exchanges were unproblematic. Though aided by 
neutral governments and national Red Cross societies, negotiations were rarely free from the 
pressure of external events.26 Russia unilaterally suspended exchanges in reprisal against the 
torpedoing of one of its hospital ships in March 1916. The following year the German High 
Command began excluding prisoners employed in front-line labour companies from repatriation 
for fear that they would reveal information on German installations.27 Officials clearly feared 
being distracted by ‘sentimental rubbish’; had public interest in the matter not been so intense, 
                                                          
24 Susanne Wolf, Neutrality: Diplomacy and Internment in the Netherlands during the First World War, 
(2013) 147-163; Georg Wurzer, Die Kriegsgefangenen der Mittelmächte in Russland im Ersten Weltkrieg 
(2008), at 387-397. 
25 See Annette Becker, Oubliés de la Grande Guerre. Humanitaire et culture de guerre (1998), at 213-
228. For evolving attitudes towards ‘barbed wire disease’, see Jones and Wessely, ‘British prisoners-of-
war: from resilience to psychological vulnerability: reality or perception’, 21 20th Century British History 
(2010) 163-183. 
26 See Hinz, ‘Humanität im Krieg? Internationales Rotes Kreuz und Kriegsgefangenenhilfe im Ersten 
Weltkrieg’, in Jochen Oltmer (ed.), Kriegsgefangene im Europa des Ersten Weltkriegs, (2006) 216, at 
226. Davis, ‘National Red Cross Societies and Prisoner of War in Russia, 1914-1918’, 28 Journal of 
Contemporary History (1993) 31-52.  
27 Jones, supra note 11, at 161. 
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especially after the outbreak of typhus in German and Russian camps over 1915 and 1916, it is 
unlikely that the negotiations would have led to such fruitful results.28  
At the same time, however, it is clear that there were strong currents propelling the 
exchange and repatriation operations. The complicated procedures and criteria for selecting 
prisoners for repatriation were agreed with comparative ease. On the western front negotiations 
were conducted through government channels, but in the east, responsibility was devolved to the 
Red Cross societies, who were naturally sympathetic to the prisoners’ humanitarian needs and 
less constrained by overtly political or military considerations.29 The arrangements were 
transferred to other theatres, building a momentum officials found difficult to resist. British 
efforts to negotiate the return of long-term prisoners in 1917 were, for instance, ‘a good deal 
hampered’ by the existence of an earlier Franco-German agreement on the same subject, the 
terms of which they disliked. ‘We have steadfastly refused to consider some of the worst features 
…’, admitted the British negotiator, ‘[but] the Germans are constantly referring to [it] and we 
cannot ignore it entirely’.30 Governments did, of course, flout agreements when it suited their 
book, but they seemed powerless to prevent the gradual liberalisation of the exchange regime; 
extending its provisions from severely invalided prisoners to more lightly-wounded and later to 
long-term or old captives or those suffering from mental or psychological infirmities. 
Arrangements governing the repatriation and neutral internment operations were likewise 
progressively relaxed. Medical criteria were loosened, selection based on the category of illness 
rather than strict numerical parity and permission granted for family members to visit internees 
in Switzerland and the Netherlands. This process was in sharp distinction to the radicalisation of 
policy and attitudes that marked other areas of POW treatment during the war.  
The impressive scale of the repatriation and exchange operations could be taken as 
indicative of the way in which the First World War echoed earlier customary or chivalric 
                                                          
28 Diary of Lt. Gen. Sir Herbert Belfield, Diary, 29 June 1917. Imperial War Museum 91/44/1 HEB 1/1. 
See The Horrors of Wittenburg. Official Report to the British Government (London: HMSO, 1916); 
Nachtigal, ‘Seuchen under militärischer Aufsicht in Rußland: Das Lager Tockoe also Beispiel für die 
Behandlung der Kriegsgefangenen 1915/1916’, 48 Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (2000) 363-
387. The belligerents also took a restrictive attitude towards their obligations under the Geneva 
Convention to return of ‘protected’ medical personnel. Cameron, ‘The ICRC in the First World War: 
Unwavering belief in the power of law?’, 97 International Review of the Red Cross (2015), 1099-1120. 
29 See Streeruwitz, ‘Die Stockholmer Konferenz 1915’, in H. Weiland and L. Kern (eds), In Feindeshand: 
Die Gefangenschaft im Weltkriege in Einzeldarstellungen 2 Vols (1920) Vol 2, 331. 
30 Sir Herbert Belfield, Diary, supra note 28, 29 June 1917. 
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conventions.31 But the nature of the exchange regime after 1914 hints at the existence of attitudes 
that were distinctively new. In widening the scope of the repatriation operations, the belligerents 
implicitly assimilated prisoners to the ‘protected’ status that had previously been reserved for 
those made hors de combat by their wounds or ill health. This was most evident in the case of the 
‘long-term’ POWs, whose treatment was based on their psychological, rather than physical, 
‘wounds’; ailments derived not from the battlefield but from the strain of prolonged detention. 
The emphasis on the prisoners’ humanitarian needs represented an advance on the views held as 
recently as 1906, when the Geneva Conference agreed that any sick and wounded combatant 
who fell into the hands of their enemies should be categorized as prisoners first, and only then 
receive special humanitarian dispensation on account of their wounds.32 By 1918, ‘barbed wire 
disease’ had transformed thinking on captivity, fostering an environment in which whole 
categories of prisoners could be released on the basis of their humanitarian and medical 
conditions. In a war of attrition, the fact that concern for the mental health of POWs superseded 
arguments for the need to continue detaining them is no small matter.   
This conceptual shift is immediately apparent in the discussions leading to the signing of 
the 1929 Geneva Convention on POWs. While the 1906 Geneva Convention merely encouraged 
belligerents to repatriate sick and wounded prisoners ‘by way of exception or favour’, the 1929 
POW convention was much more insistent. Belligerents were ‘required’ to repatriate seriously 
wounded men ‘without regard to rank or numbers’ (Article 68). The Convention also followed 
the wartime agreements – notably the US-German agreement of November 1918 – in laying out 
detailed selection criteria and procedures for organising repatriation operations. Only the 
prospect of accommodating long-term prisoners ‘in good health’ in neutral countries was left 
optional (Article 72), on the grounds that it was unwise to legislate on the actions of states not 
party to the conflict. As for the thorny issue of repatriating prisoners at the end of hostilities, the 
drafters in 1929 could find no way of improving on the 1907 Hague Regulation’s rule for 
                                                          
31 Nachtigal estimates the number of men released before October 1918 at about 1.2 million. ‘The 
repatriation and reception of returning POWs, 1918-1922’, 26 Immigrants & Minorities (2008) 157. For 
repatriations after 1939, see Overmans, ‘The Repatriation of Prisoners of War once Hostilities are Over: 
A Matter of Course?’, in B. Moore and B. Hately-Broad (eds), Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: 
Captivity, Homecoming and Memory in World War II (2005), at 11. 
32 Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Geneva Convention of 1864, Geneva, Minutes of 1st 
committee, 4th Meeting, 19 June 1906. Davis, ‘The Geneva Convention of 1906’, 1 AJIL 409 at 414. 
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repatriation to take place ‘as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace’ (Article 75).33 They 
did, though, seek to close one loophole by preventing any denunciation of the convention from 
taking effect before the repatriation of prisoners was complete (Article 96). Parole was entirely 
absent from the 1929 POW convention. It was only reinstated in the 1949 Geneva Convention 
(III) (Article 21) after states had repeatedly reverted to the practice during the Second World 
War as a means to facilitate a more humanitarian treatment of individual prisoners of war in 
specific cases.34 
That most humanitarian of gestures – releasing men from captivity into the care of their 
families and loved-ones – was thus granted in the 1929 Convention as a set of discrete rights, not 
as favours based on the strength of a man’s word or by allegiance to some traditional martial 
code. Though largely accepted today, this important conceptual shift has come under pressure, 
such as when states have refused to release or repatriate prisoners deemed guilty of violating the 
laws of war. While not entirely new – after 1914 both London and Washington sought, 
unsuccessfully, to exclude U-Boat crews from release arrangements – the Cold War conflicts 
frequently saw prisoners branded as war criminals and refused release.35 At the same time, the 
principle was strengthened in the 1949 Convention by an obligation to allow wounded and sick 
POWs to make an individual decision as to whether they wish to be repatriated, in keeping with 




During the First World War, prisoners of war suffered greatly from the consequences of 
measures purportedly taken in reprisal for unlawful acts allegedly committed by their respective 
states. Reprisals against POWs were not prohibited under international law, and states entered 
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the war in 1914 determined, as the French government put it, to exercise their ‘full right of 
reprisals which they might find themselves brought to exercise against an enemy so little 
regardful of its plighted word’.37 Some of the reprisal measures, such as suspending 
communication rights, might appear prosaic, but all reprisals, however ‘petty’, undermined the 
authority of the POW regime.38 As Isabel Hull observes, the First World War was to be 
‘disfigured by wave after wave of violent reprisals exercised with lethal stubbornness’.39 
Germany, and arguably France too, opened ‘reprisal camps’ where prisoners were subjected to 
deliberately harsh or humiliating treatment in reprisal for the alleged wrong-doing of their 
adversaries.40 By 1917, the French, Germans and British were holding prisoners in front line 
labour companies, where, in apparent contravention of Article 6 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, 
the men were employed on war-related tasks, often within range of their own guns, and denied 
access to relief parcels or inspection visits by neutral diplomats.41 Those parties finally agreed to 
move the prisoners thirty kilometres behind the front lines, but even then, they continued to 
threaten retaliation for alleged infringements on the letter or spirit of their agreements and to use 
POWs in war-related work.42 
The cycle of reprisals taken against POWs between 1914 and 1918 has been construed in 
different ways: some historians see it as a vector for the increasing violence toward POWs as the 
war progressed,43 while others point to the fact that the term ‘reprisal’ was used to justify 
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unlawful behaviour, not necessarily connected with an intent to redress or deter unlawful 
behaviour on behalf of their enemies.44 
A reprisal is an act that would normally be unlawful, taken in response to a prior 
unlawful act, with the aim of getting the ‘scofflaw’ to return to compliance with the law. In 1914, 
while it was accepted that the taking of reprisals was permissible under international law, there 
was little clarity as to how reprisals could be applied in practice. In the Naulilaa case (1928), the 
arbiters, assessing a situation that occurred in 1914, held that for a reprisal to be lawful, there had 
to be a violation of an existing rule of international law, an announcement that measures of 
reprisal would be taken if the state did not comply with the law, and proportionality between the 
violation and the measures taken in response.45 While there was no agreement over what office a 
person must occupy in order to institute legitimate reprisals, it was certainly not an individual 
form of vengeance. Likewise, reprisals at that time, as for countermeasures and reprisals now, 
could only be taken in response to a wrong attributable to a state.46  
One reason for the lack of precision on the question of reprisals lay in the fact that the 
1907 Hague Conventions had passed over the matter in silence. Though delegates clearly viewed 
reprisals as an essential deterrent against violations of the law of war, they were reluctant to 
encourage, entrench or legitimize practices which were so obviously distasteful.47 The resulting 
‘arbitrariness’ of the pre-war reprisals regime clearly worried contemporaries, and led 
Oppenheim, amongst others, to insist on the ‘imperative necessity’ of regulating state practice.48 
The issue was all the more pressing given the relative fragility of rules governing the treatment 
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of POWs, and the concomitant danger that they would fall victim to states bent on enacting 
reprisal measures. 
The inherent humanitarian concerns of belligerent reprisals are self-evident. They are a 
mechanism that relies on punishing persons who are not responsible for the initial violation and 
who may be powerless to stop it. Furthermore, the lawful recourse to reprisals hinges on the 
existence of a previous violation of an international rule, in circumstances in which it is 
extremely difficult to determine whether a violation has indeed occurred and where there is no 
independent body capable of rapidly adjudicating the matter. It is thus left up to the aggrieved 
state to draw its own conclusion and take the necessary or ‘appropriate’ action.49 In case of 
mistake, reprisals may lead to irreparable harm and are always at risk of abuse. In the First 
World War, reprisals led to a vicious cycle of acts, each more barbaric than the last, and left the 
normally applicable law in tatters. Aside from the horrific consequences for their hapless 
victims, the use of reprisals after 1914 revealed a number of elements which cast doubt on their 
value as a means of enforcing international law.  
In practice, reprisals are frequently orchestrated in such a way as to provoke a public 
backlash. They are state reactions to another state’s behaviour, but in order to work, they often 
rely on public pressure to bring their government round to abandoning the allegedly unlawful 
behaviour out of concern for the welfare of their own loved ones.50 It is a state-to-state 
mechanism, triangulated through making the population suffer. Thus in 1916 and 1917, Berlin 
deliberately allowed uncensored letters to reach the families of prisoners held in ‘reprisal camps’ 
in the hope of compelling the French government to end its detention of German POWs in camps 
in North Africa. The tactic had the desired result in this case, but it was less successful with the 
British; partly due to the smaller number of British POWs affected by the German reprisals, 
partly to London’s reluctance to rescind the measure that had incited German ire in the first 
place, and partly too, to London’s conviction that the employment of German prisoners in French 
ports did not violate its obligations under the Hague Regulations.51 The episode again underlined 
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the dangers of reprisals, as London’s obduracy prolonged the suffering of 2,000 British prisoners 
in German reprisal camps. 
The public aspect of reprisals also affected the parties’ ability to take effective reprisal 
measures. With Germany holding many more prisoners than France, the French authorities 
clearly felt constrained in their ability to play to the public gallery in Germany, and consequently 
were more restrained in their use of belligerent reprisals. Correspondence between the ICRC and 
the Quai d’Orsay in late 1915 shows the extent of French frustration at trying to match German 
actions, and their inventiveness in searching for alternative reprisal strategies.52 Ironically, one of 
the suggestions aired at the time, directing reprisal measures against German aristocrats, echoed 
a policy that Germany had employed earlier in the year when attempting to stop London’s 
segregation of U-Boat prisoners. In both cases, the ultimate objective lay in maximising the 
political impact of the reprisal measures in the target state. It is, though, difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that reprisals were likely to be a successful tool primarily in the hands of the more 
dominant, more powerful, or more ruthless state.53 
Linked to this is the perception of the existence of a violation justifying the resort to 
reprisals. Isabel Hull argues that the French tended to take reprisals based on information 
supplied in neutral camp inspection reports, whereas their German counterparts tended to rely on 
‘the army’s unverified suspicions about the enemy’s behaviour.’54 In an unregulated system, 
although good faith must play a role, there was no consensus on what kind of information could 
be used to either indicate whether a violation had occurred or justify recourse to reprisal actions. 
Moreover, the fact that German policy, particularly in the later war years, lay in the hands of the 
High Command rather than civilian ministries, meant that decisions over reprisals were less 
susceptible to the anxieties of the German public or concerns over the Reich’s legal reputation 
than was the case in London and Paris.55  
Moreover, in the case of the French and British POWs held in the reprisal camps, it was 
not entirely clear that the situation leading to the reprisal in fact constituted a violation of the 
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Hague Regulations. As we have seen, this was certainly the view taken in London.56 It was also, 
intriguingly, reflected in the ICRC’s internal discussions over whether to discredit German 
justification for its detention of French prisoners in ‘reprisal camps’ by disseminating its reports 
on the French camps in Morocco. The ICRC delegates apparently believed that the standards of 
treatment in Morocco did not amount to a violation of international law. In fact, the ICRC 
president even reminded his French interlocutors of the existence of these reports, in the belief 
that public knowledge of their contents might be sufficient to bring about a reversal in German 
policy. German ‘reprisal’ action might, then, have forced France into removing German 
prisoners from Morocco, but may not have been fully motivated by a concern for respect of the 
law.  Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that German policy was based on a belief that in 
detaining German prisoners in Morocco France was deliberately seeking to undermine German 
prestige in the eyes of the local population; it was this political objective, and not concerns over 
the physical health or wellbeing of their men, that steeled German attitudes on the issue.  
Various steps and confidence building measures were taken to halt the relentless recourse 
to reprisals, or prevent them, once enacted, from escalating out of control into a spiral of 
increasingly brutal measures and counter-measures. From early 1915 neutral diplomats were 
called upon to inspect prison camps and investigate allegations of ill-treatment. On 12 July 1916, 
the ICRC called on the parties to renounce the use of reprisals against prisoners.57 That same 
year, the belligerents opened negotiations to improve the lot of prisoners, including agreements 
on the deployment of prisoners outside the battle zone, obligatory four-week notice periods prior 
to enacting reprisals, and arrangements to diffuse incipient tensions around the treatment of 
POWs, including pledging to attempt to negotiate.58 The effectiveness of these measures was 
limited. Reprisal measures continued to impinge on the lives of POWs until the final days of the 
war. Even those governments that outwardly deprecated the use of reprisals rarely resisted the 
temptation to use them when circumstances required: having spent the best part of three years 
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working to eliminate the use of reprisals, the United States soon resorted to them on entering the 
war as a belligerent in April 1917.59 
The efforts taken to diminish, regulate, and finally eliminate reprisals against prisoners of 
war are indicative of the struggle to find effective and humane mechanisms to ensure the respect 
of the law of armed conflict. The question of reprisals goes to the heart of states’ fear of finding 
themselves powerless in the face of violations of international law of which they are victim.60 
The problem rippled through the post-war debates on POW affairs. At the 1920 meeting of the 
International Law Association (ILA), statements like those of Mr. Wyndham Bewes, who 
described ‘the infliction of reprisals upon innocent individuals for the crimes of their 
Government’ as ‘revolting and atrocious’ were greeted with applause.61 But the Association 
nevertheless found it difficult to countenance an outright ban on reprisals or any measure that 
effectively removed from ‘the hands of the constituted authorities the only weapon [they] have 
against cruelty’.62 The members of the ILA seem to have clung to the possibility of exercising 
reprisals specifically against POWs, even though it had long been understood that reprisals need 
not mirror the violations they were intended to stop. Curiously, in both the ILA meetings and the 
subsequent Diplomatic Conference in 1929, no one seems to have corrected this misconception. 
Draft conventions produced by the ILA and other agencies over the course of the 1920s thus 
sought to regulate the resort to reprisals and tasked protecting powers ‘to endeavour to eliminate 
the reasons for the reprisals, either by arranging a personal discussion between delegates of the 
belligerent Powers…or in such other manner as may seem to it in the circumstances more 
appropriate’.63  
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Against this, the ICRC insisted that there was no place for reprisals in POW law. 
Building on its 1916 appeal, but refined over the course of the 1921 and 1923 International 
Conferences of the Red Cross, the position was grounded on the belief that once reprisals were 
admitted in theory, states were unlikely to feel limited by any artful constraints imposed by 
international jurists. After all, most of the restrictions proposed by those in favour of reserving 
the right to resort to reprisals were drawn from the war time agreements, none of which had 
succeeded in either ending reprisals or fully containing their use. More significantly, though, the 
ICRC’s position was derived from the new status of war victims being claimed for POWs. 
Admitting to states the right to penalize defenceless prisoners for the alleged wrong-doings of 
their compatriots flew in the face of the committee’s determination to entrench prisoners’ 
position as ‘humanitarian’ subjects. Thus, the last paragraph of Article 2 of the 1929 Convention 
stated unequivocally, ‘measures of reprisals against POWs are forbidden’.  
Admittedly, no injunction against reprisals had been included in the 1864 and 1906 
Conventions on the wounded and sick, nor did it feature in the revised convention on them in 
1929.64 The reason for this lay partly in the general absence of incidents involving reprisals 
against sick and wounded soldiers, and partly in the reluctance of jurists to legislate over events 
that took place on the battlefield. The prohibition of reprisals in the 1929 POW Convention 
naturally covered, though, men who entered captivity as sick or wounded. The Convention also 
specifically included measures that met the needs of sick and wounded prisoners, such as 
injunctions against delays to their repatriation or obstacles to the provision of medical facilities. 
In this sense, Article 2’s prohibition on reprisals went beyond merely elevating POWs to the 
status of privileged combatants; it set a new standard of protection and extended this privilege to 
the traditional category of sick and wounded soldiers. The article was critical, therefore, in 
cementing the conceptual shift that transformed POWs from ‘disarmed enemies’ into ‘victims of 
war’. This was, moreover, widely acknowledged at the time.65 In the words of the US delegate, 
the ban on reprisals represented nothing less than a ‘new humanitarian rule of international 
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law’.66 ‘Were [the convention] to contain but this one principle’, the conference rapporteur 
triumphantly proclaimed to those present, ‘you would not have met in vain’.67 
The terse minutes of the 1929 conference give little indication as to why the delegates 
accepted the ICRC’s position on reprisals so willingly. The laconic record makes it difficult to 
know whether, as Kalshoven suggests, the negotiators of the 1929 Convention were willing to 
abandon the possibility of using reprisals against POWs because of their faith in the potential of 
the protecting power system to curb violations of IHL.68 In the absence of evidence, it seems 
difficult to draw this conclusion. On the other hand, recognition of the broader significance of 
the ICRC’s intentions for the article certainly seems to have played a role. A British report on the 
conference wrote of ‘one delegation after another’ speaking in favour of the ICRC’s draft and 
condemning Britain’s support for reprisals as ‘a step backwards in civilization’.69 The American 
delegation was apparently flattered into supporting the motion by the (erroneous) claim that its 
inspiration lay in the US Lieber code of 1863.70 Only three delegations spoke in favour of 
retaining reprisals, but the weight of opinion behind an absolute ban was so overwhelming that 
the objections were withdrawn and the vote carried unanimously.71 Following this initial ban, the 
potential targets for belligerent reprisals during armed conflicts have been progressively 
restricted.72 
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The final area we consider is arguably the most important: the establishment of neutral oversight 
of the POW regime. This development was not merely decisive in strengthening the robustness 
of the POW regime and promoting state compliance, but it was also, as we shall see, important in 
setting POW law down a path that helped ensure its long term coherence and universality. The 
challenge of holding states to their humanitarian obligations had long frustrated international 
jurists. None of the proposals aired by the ICRC to tackle abuses of the Geneva Convention since 
the 1860s elicited much sympathy from the major powers. Nor was there any immediate 
enthusiasm shown for the example set by the Union government in trying and executing 
Confederate officers found guilty of ill-treating prisoners under their care.73 Indeed, so reluctant 
were delegates at the first Hague conference to admit external interference into the conduct of 
war that no one saw fit to raise the possibility of extending the writ of the newly minted 
Permanent Court of Arbitration into this area of activity, despite the fact that a proposal along 
these lines had been in existence since 1872.74 Before 1914 therefore, the laws of war occupied 
the frayed edges of international law, with state compliance ultimately resting on the strength of 
their own domestic legislation and military regulations and fear of reprisals. 
 This is not to say that external influences were entirely absent from the lives of POWs. 
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations both acknowledged a role for neutral relief societies in 
this area, whether official or voluntary.75 The list of agencies jostling to administer to prisoners’ 
needs after 1914 was a long one, from aristocratic ‘sisters of mercy’ and representatives of the 
members of religious orders and the YMCA, to neutral Red Cross societies, mixed medical 
commissions (responsible for selecting prisoners for repatriation) and the ICRC.76 What 
distinguished these organisations from the protecting powers was that the former based their 
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right to act on humanitarian grounds, and on the recent stipulations covering the work of ‘relief 
societies’. The locus standi of protecting powers, by contrast, flowed from the customary 
practice of neutral states offering their ‘good offices’ to promote amicable political relations 
between states in the absence, for whatever reason, of formal diplomatic relations.77 The 
traditional functions of protecting powers had slowly expanded over the latter half of the 19th 
century. The Franco-Prussian war added the protection of enemy nationals to the protecting 
power’s remit, while the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 saw protecting power diplomats 
visiting places of detention and submitting formal reports on their findings. This practice had not, 
though, received widespread recognition by the time war erupted in 1914. It was only in early 
1915 that the US embassies in Berlin and London contrived to establish formal inspection 
programmes for British and German POWs and persuade their respective hosts to permit 
embassy staff to hold confidential meetings with prisoners’ representatives or committees, 
assembled for the purpose.  
Once established, however, this ‘wedge of a tolerated practice’, as one contemporary put 
it, was swiftly extended to other theatres and grew to become an ‘openly recognized and 
accepted definite system’.78 By the war’s close, protecting powers were firmly inserted into the 
POW regime and accorded specific responsibilities in the belligerents’ wartime agreements. 
Their operations were by no means entirely free from abuse. Far from easing relations between 
the belligerents, inspection reports were frequently used to justify the taking of reprisals or lend 
authority to government accusations of bad faith on the part of their enemies. Neutral delegates 
were generally barred from the zone of military operations, where upwards of a third of prisoners 
were routinely held, often in appallingly unhealthy and dangerous conditions. Camp visits were 
frequently obstructed by local military authorities, who resented foreign interference and often 
saw themselves as operating outside the political chain of command. In a number of cases, 
permission to visit camps was withheld from protecting power representatives, even when 
granted to other neutral agencies.79 By 1918, Spanish diplomats in Germany had become so 
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frustrated by the way they were treated, that Madrid considered withdrawing its services 
altogether.80  
Yet while belligerents were ready to make life difficult for neutral diplomats, they 
evidently found it difficult to dispense with their services entirely, or forego the reciprocal 
advantages they brought. Even restrictions imposed on camp inspections by way of reprisal – for 
a period in 1918 the French and Germans withdrew the right to converse with detainees out of 
ear-shot of the camp authorities – attested to the significance both governments attached to this 
facility. By the end of the war, neutral inspection visits were widely accepted as the principal 
institutional innovation in POW affairs to emerge out of the war.81 So while delegates at the 
1929 Geneva conference struggled to agree on the extent of powers to be given to neutral 
diplomats, the principle of neutral involvement as ‘an essential part of the convention’ was 
agreed without demur.82 Even hard-bitten observers like the ICRC veteran Mme Renée 
Marguerite Frick-Cramer saw the protecting power as the principal guarantor, to prevent the new 
POW convention succumbing to the problems that had bedevilled its predecessor after 1914, 
saying,  
 
It cannot be denied that, owing to the length of the hostilities, the prisoners have become 
a political instrument (propaganda camps, sending POWs to Morocco, continuing to 
detain POWs after the armistice), […] which is an infinitely regrettable fact. Let us hope 
that with the new Convention, thanks to the oversight/supervision of neutrals and the 
possibility of the belligerent powers to hear each other out, misunderstandings will be 
avoided and instructions given at the highest level will be carried out.83 
 
 The immediate importance of this innovation lay in the practical benefits it brought to the 
new POW regime; providing a level of external oversight where none had hitherto existed. It 
also, though, had wider ramifications for the nascent corpus of IHL. For the first time, a system 
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was devised to hold states to their obligations towards a category of war victims that went 
beyond the ‘threat’ of moral censure or belligerent reprisal, or reliance on the good faith of 
military commanders. In this sense, it edged IHL away from the ‘disappearing margins’ of 
international law, and gave it a level of traction that had been singularly lacking since its initial 
inception in the 1860s.  
Its significance also lay in its limitations; in what it was not. In establishing 
‘organizations of control’ grounded on the harsh realities of neutral inspections during the First 
World War, the 1929 conference deliberately turned its back on other ways of promoting 
compliance with the POW regime. The possibility, for instance, of bringing violators before the 
League of Nations council or the Permanent Court of International Justice, founded in 1922, 
were both explicitly rejected, despite featuring in some of the draft codes drawn up over the 
1920s. The experience of pressing criminal charges against those accused of ill-treating POWs in 
the post-war tribunals at Leipzig and Istanbul proved equally disappointing; revealing, in the 
words of the chairman of the British Red Cross, the ‘impossibility of securing adequate 
punishment for those guilty’ of violating the conventions.84 Finally, a US proposal that 
protecting powers be specifically tasked with investigating infractions and publicising their 
results, was voted down at the conference. The 1929 POW Convention merely encouraged the 
belligerents to follow the example set in the First World War and resolve any problems through 
dialogue, facilitated where necessary through the good offices of their protecting powers.85  
In bestowing a deliberately narrow remit on protecting powers, the delegates in 1929 
accurately reflected the prevailing mood, and struck what would prove to be an astute balance 
between humanitarianism on the one side, and the willingness of mid-twentieth century states to 
accede to external interference in their military affairs on the other. What dented the record of 
protecting powers during the Second World War was not the failure of the supervisory regime 
invested in the 1929 POW Convention, but the calculated denial by some governments of any 
legal or normative restraints on the conduct of war fighting, and the treatment of enemy 
                                                          
84 Sir Arthur Stanley (British Red Cross) to Gustav Ador (ICRC), 11 June 1921. NARA. RG200. Group 2 
1917-1935 Box 77. See Segesser, ‘The punishment of war crimes committed against prisoners of war, 
deportees and refugees during and after the First World War’, 26 Immigrants & Minorities (2008) 134-
156; Kramer, ‘The First Wave of International War Crimes Trials: Istanbul and Leipzig’, 14 European 
Review (2006), 441-455. 
85 Actes de la Conférence diplomatique, supra note 82, at 518. See the commentary on Article 49 of the 
First Geneva Convention, ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention (2016), paras 2823-2827. 
26 
 
nationals, whether military or civilian. Although the protecting power articles were strengthened 
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and extended to cover all categories of war victim (not just 
POWs), the fundamental characteristics of the protection regime remained unchanged. As a 
result, when states began retreating from the practice of state-based protection in the mid-1950s, 
questioning the validity of neutrality in the ideologically charged conditions of the Cold War, 
there was sufficient residual commitment to the principal of external supervision to allow a 
semblance of humanitarian oversight to emerge in its stead.86 
Finally, in resisting the temptation to leave oversight of the implementation of the 1929 
POW Convention to either judicial bodies, such as the Permanent Court of International Justice , 
or political institutions, such as the League Council, the drafters of the 1929 Convention may 
have unwittingly helped insulate the nascent POW regime from pressures that might in time have 
led to its undoing. Arguably, the choice to entrench an in situ supervisory mechanism reinforced 
the understanding of the law as purely humanitarian. While efforts to boost the potential of 
criminal law to ensure respect for IHL have recently increased massively, the focus on these 
internal mechanisms conveyed the clear message that what matters first and foremost is the 
ability to stop and correct non-compliant behaviour as soon as possible, before such behaviour 
leads to more victims. In fact, the imperative need to strengthen compliance with IHL has again 
been recognized by States and the components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.87 
In this light, IHL’s ‘legitimacy’ can partly be explained by the lessons learnt after 1914 and the 
decision, in 1929, to inaugurate a system of oversight that was embedded in the POW convention 
and did not rely for its force on either the threat of post-war justice and the criminalisation of 
wrong-doers or the support of political institutions founded on the shifting sands of great power 
consensus. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
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Recent research has revised our assumptions about the place of the First World War in the 
broader history of the twentieth century.88 Although the cataclysmic destruction and new forms 
of violence remain the war’s hallmark, historians have become increasingly conscious of those 
‘innovative humanitarian countermeasures’ that helped save lives and rebuild societies.89 This 
innovation is no more apparent than in the area of POW law, where the challenge of war 
prompted a fundamental reappraisal of the regulations and norms governing the treatment of 
POWs. If the full expression of this process had to wait until the signing of the four Geneva 
Conventions in 1949, it remains the case that many of the distinguishing features of modern IHL 
had their roots in the experience of captivity during the First World War and the legal 
developments which followed in its wake. The scale, duration and intensity of wartime captivity 
after 1914 gave rise to a conceptual shift in the way POWs were perceived in international law, 
transforming their status from ‘disarmed combatants’, whose special privileges were derived 
from their position as members of the armed forces, to ‘humanitarian subjects’, whose treatment 
was based on an understanding of their humanitarian needs. Humanitarians had advocated a 
separate convention for POWs, similar to that enjoyed by the battlefield sick and wounded, for 
over half a century.90 But while many of the 1929 Convention’s humanitarian features  initially 
figured in the ICRC’s draft text, the ICRC was not alone in advocating a ‘humanitarian’ 
approach to the new convention. 91 Indeed, by the late 1920s a broad consensus had formed 
around this issue. Representative of this view was the German jurist Friedrich Wolle, who argued 
in early 1929 that any new POW code had to be ‘a product of humanity (ein Ausfluβ der 
Menschlichkeit)’. The ‘principle of humanity’, he wrote, should stand as the ‘leitmotiv, rule and 
guideline for the entire POW law […] It must […] be placed at the forefront of POW law in 
order to clearly emphasize the spirit that prevails, and must prevail, over the new rules’.92 It was 
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this spirit that the British delegation encountered, rather to its surprise, when it tried to argue in 
favour of retaining the right to inflict reprisals against POWs. It can also be seen in the emphasis 
placed on repatriation in the new convention, and in the recognition that imprisonment itself 
could damage prisoners’ health, and was not the ‘inexpensive rest-cure after the wearisome 
turmoil of fighting’ assumed by some pre-war critics.93  
 This new status was embedded in a convention that itself represented a major departure 
from the pre-war codes. The ill-treatment meted out to prisoners during the First World War lent 
weight to those who insisted that the new convention should go beyond defining the obligations 
and responsibilities of the detaining power, and instead articulate treatment in terms of prisoners’ 
rights. Such thinking reflected a broader awareness of transnational issues, and the shift to a 
rights-based discourse for refugees, labour, minorities and children that was consciously 
‘developed, asserted, and defended in response to the chaos that Europe experienced in the 
aftermath of the Great War’.94 Under the 1929 Convention, prisoners enjoyed rights as protected 
subjects under international law, not by dint of ‘exception or favour’, military honour, customary 
practice or even charity. They had the right to direct repatriation if invalided, the ‘right to 
complain’ about their conditions of internment and to communicate with neutral representatives 
(Article 42); the right to a qualified lawyer and interpreter if involved in judicial hearings and the 
right of appeal against their sentences (Article 62).95 Moreover, for the first time, prisoners – and 
prisoners alone – could appeal to neutral diplomats to intercede on their behalf if their rights 
were withheld, or if their conditions of captivity amounted to inhumane or degrading treatment. 
There was then, a clear substantive and conceptual distinction between the two ‘humanitarian’ 
conventions signed at Geneva in 1929, and the earlier Hague Regulations of 1899/1907 
governing the conduct of armed conflicts.96 
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The rights, and the principles that underpinned them, sat alongside a detailed list of 
specific provisions, covering all aspects of custody.97 This had obvious practical consequences: 
as the ICRC’s legal expert, Paul des Gouttes, put it ‘in the monotonous daily life of the prisoners 
of war, it is the details which matter’.98 But it also reflected a profound shift in the way IHL was 
framed. In the months leading up to the 1929 conference – and even in its first sessions – 
protagonists wrestled with two different approaches to the codification process. One envisaged a 
convention based on customary practice and principles but shorn of cumbersome details that 
might prove impractical or embarrassing in practice. The approach was epitomized in the US 
draft convention brought to Geneva in 1929 which proposed a simple revision of the Hague 
Regulations, based on the US-German agreement of 1918 and a code drawn up by the ILA in 
1921. Drafted by the War Department, the US project provided general lines and broad 
declarations, and reserved detailed provisions to special conventions drawn up by the 
belligerents. Whether this amounted to an Anglo-American approach, as some contemporaries 
claimed, is open to debate, though there is little doubt that the British, mindful of their 
experiences in the First World War, shared Washington’s preference for a convention that 
distilled key principles rather than sought to legislate for every possible contingency.99 
The alternative approach, associated at the time with a continental or Latin view of 
jurisprudence, placed more faith in the substance of codified laws, and saw the value of 
enveloping governments, their militaries and camp authorities, in a set of detailed provisions.100 
This was not without its dangers. The more detailed the treaty, the greater the possibility of 
triggering reprisals for alleged non-compliance.101 This was a quandary well known to neutral 
diplomats, who often found their camp visit reports used by the belligerents to justify the very 
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reprisals their inspections had meant to allay. And yet, the war had also shown that the 
belligerents were ready to seize upon ‘every vagueness and loophole’ to justify taking reprisals 
against prisoners in their care.102 Although events in the late 1930s and 1940s soon exposed its 
limitations, on balance, the 1929 POW Convention ultimately represented a triumph of precision 
over broad-brush principles.103 This marked another departure from the pre-war treaties, but also 
set IHL on a path that would become increasingly comprehensive and exacting, and insistent on 
the privileges it granted to the victims of armed conflict. Even those delegates at the 1929 
conference who were initially in favour of the American draft found their views soften, as the 
cultural, historical and political differences between the various parties made themselves felt: the 
Mexican proposition that soldiers who had been gassed were not ‘sick or wounded’ but merely 
suffering from a ‘depreciation of health’, or the Italian insistence that any medical treatment 
given to injured prisoners be administered ‘with humanity’, lest amputations were conducted 
without anaesthetic.104 The twentieth century has witnessed an unmistakable trend toward the 
adoption of more detailed rules, coupled with the development of a variety of enforcement 
mechanisms for IHL, all the while limiting the scope for reprisals. The prohibition on reprisals in 
the 1929 POW Convention is thus anything but anodyne. 
 Finally, changing attitudes towards POWs influenced the trajectory of IHL in other areas, 
most notably the position of civilians and enemy aliens living in occupied territory. At best, this 
category of individual shared the fate of POWs: their basic treatment and conditions of captivity 
frequently followed the regulations governing military prisoners. At worst, they were subjected 
to savage victimisation and brutality, such that their fate became a cause célèbre at home and 
across the neutral world.105 To humanitarian observers, the importance of legislating in favour of 
civilians was self-evident and throughout the inter-war era various attempts were made in this 
direction. The ICRC’s first draft comprising 103 articles and tabled at the 1923 International Red 
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Cross Conference, explicitly sought to assimilate the new legal categories of ‘deportees, 
evacuees and refugees’ to the traditional position occupied by ‘military prisoners’. The logic 
behind extending the rights of POWs to civilian male detainees of military age was particularly 
strong.106 The ICRC also, however, championed other mechanisms to protect civilians caught up 
in the maelstrom of war; inviolable ‘sanitary zones’, where medical aid could be dispensed to the 
local population, and ‘zones of security’, or ‘lieu de Genève’, which offered civilians safe refuge 
from the fighting.  
All these initiatives built directly on the practical and conceptual innovations found in the 
1929 POW convention. Although ‘civilians’ were ultimately excluded from discussion in 1929 – 
for fear of endangering the chances of securing agreement on the Conventions on POWs and the 
Wounded and Sick – the subject was addressed in the ‘Tokyo draft’ of 1934. This brief draft 
convention distilled the essence of the 1929 POW Convention, and adopted many of its key 
features, such as the prohibition against reprisals (draft article 10) and access to relief supplies 
(draft article 8), and replicated its oversight mechanisms and processes for settling disputes (draft 
articles 23, 24). Draft Article 17 even went so far as to make the POW Convention ‘by analogy 
applicable to civilian internees’, and pledged a level treatment that was ‘in no case inferior’ to 
that accorded to military prisoners. The viability of the ICRC’s ‘zones of security’ and ‘sanitary 
zones’ were likewise dependent on the system of neutral supervision and oversight provided by 
the protecting powers.  
These hesitant inroads into civilian protection did not long survive contact with war after 
September 1939. But to assume that they were of little consequence, or were representative of 
customary norms whose days had long past, is to overlook the broader legal and historical 
significance of the innovations that emerged out of the First World War. The excesses of the 
Second World War did not obliterate the advances made in the preceding two decades; nor did it 
give rise to ideas on international humanitarianism that were divorced from the experiences that 
went before. In a very real sense, the conceptual bedrock of modern IHL that took shape in the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, emerged out of the mud and rubble of the First World War, as 
much as the dust clouds and death-camps of the Second.   
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